Received: From KL.SRI.COM by CRVAX.SRI.COM with TCP; Fri, 11 NOV 88 09:54:13 PDT Received: from ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU by KL.SRI.COM with TCP; Fri, 11 Nov 88 09:25:58 PST Received: by ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU (5.59/1.31) id AA17265; Fri, 11 Nov 88 07:37:15 PST Received: from USENET by ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU with netnews for info-vax@kl.sri.com (info-vax@kl.sri.com) (contact usenet@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU if you have questions) Date: 10 Nov 88 23:46:34 GMT From: mailrus!uflorida!haven!uvaarpa!hudson!astsun1!jvb7u@tut.cis.ohio-state.edu (brinkmann jonathan v) Organization: University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Astronomy Department Subject: How to plug DECNET security hole Message-Id: <748@hudson.acc.virginia.edu> Sender: info-vax-request@kl.sri.com To: info-vax@kl.sri.com The recent discussion regarding security holes in DECnet reminds me of the NASA breakin a couple of years ago by some West German hackers. I'll summarize how to take care of those holes: 1) Add the command CLEAR OBJECT TASK ALL to the file SYS$MANAGER:STARTNET.COM. It should be placed after the last NCP command in that file. This closes the door to all the trojan horse command files (TELL.COM, etc.). The object TASK is a generic task which can be used to execute commands remotely via the DECnet account. 2) Protect all sensitive files (not only system files, but also anything you wouldn't want someone outside your organization to have access to. The easiest way to do this is with ACL... SET FILE/ACL=(IDENTIFIER=NETWORK, ACCESS=NONE) filename(s) 3) If you are not satisfied with these changes (they will stop 99% of all breakins), you can remove the DECnet default account. However, this makes access by authorized users difficult without seting up a NETUAF.DAT file, which opens up a security hole if the burglar uses password guessing (as the Internet virus did), since he then has full access to any machine with NETUAF.DAT entries for the user he breaks in as. I haven't mentioned the non-network security steps that should be taken, as these should already be in place, e.g., denying DIALUP and REMOTE access to public accounts with known passwords, protecting the files in the SYS$MANAGER and SYS$SYSTEM directories from WORLD access except when necessary and using the security auditing package to keep track of breakin attempts. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bradley's Bromide: If computers get too powerful, we can organize them into a committee -- that will do them in. ================================================================================ __ / / ) / / _ __ /--< __ o ____ /_ ______ __. ____ ____ (__/ (_)_/ <_ /___/ / (_<_/ / <_/\_/ / / <_(_/|_/ / <_/ / <_ ================================================================================ Dr. Jon Brinkmann Bitnet: jvb7u@Virginia.EDU Astronomy Department Internet: jvb7u@128.143.20.40 University of Virginia SPAN/HEPnet: 6654::jvb7u P.O. Box 3818 Charlottesvile, VA 22903-0818 ================================================================================