Article 33832 of alt.security: Path: nntpd.lkg.dec.com!crl.dec.com!crl.dec.com!caen!newsxfer.itd.umich.edu!news.mathworks.com!gatech!sdd.hp.com!hplabs!unix.sri.com!news.Stanford.EDU!Networking.Stanford.EDU!llurch From: Rich Graves Newsgroups: comp.security.misc,alt.security,comp.os.ms-windows.networking.misc,comp.os.ms-windows.networking.windows,comp.os.ms-windows.nt.admin.networks Subject: Microsoft continues to mislead public about Windows security bugs (a bit long, with references) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 1996 19:15:17 -0800 Organization: Stanford University Lines: 112 Message-ID: NNTP-Posting-Host: networking.stanford.edu Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII To: cypherpunks@toad.com X-PGP-key: finger llurch@mordor.stanford.edu X-URL: http://www-leland.stanford.edu/~llurch/ Xref: nntpd.lkg.dec.com comp.security.misc:25482 alt.security:33832 comp.os.ms-windows.networking.misc:10198 comp.os.ms-windows.networking.windows:12459 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Please do not dismiss this as mere "Microsoft Bashing." c2.org has similar promotions running for Netscape, DigiCash, and Java. The following is a quote from Microsoft's "Knowledge Base" technical support and marketing database, which is online in CompuServe and at: http://www.microsoft.com/kb/peropsys/windows/q90271.htm Security of the Windows for Workgroups Password Cache _____________________________________________________ The password list file is encrypted with an algorithm that meets the U.S. government Data Encryption Standard (DES). This encryption technology is the highest security allowed in software exported from the United States. The odds of breaking the encryption algorithm are less than those for random guesses of what the password might be. Even if your logon password is blank, Windows for Workgroups generates seemingly random data in your PWL file, so you cannot discover the passwords if you look at the PWL file using a file viewer. Currently, no user interface exists that allows you to unencrypt passwords in the PWL file, so password caching in Windows for Workgroups is as secure as the choice of the password used to encrypt your PWL file. As Microsoft well knows, this is completely untrue. The rest of the world has known that this is untrue since November 29th. Microsoft quietly acknowledged on December 7th (after a day of much "Internet Strategy" hype, and after the deadline for the morning papers) that the exact same implementation was insecure in Windows 95, and claims to have released a patch that fixes the problem (the efficacy of the Win95 patch does not appear to have been verified by anyone outside Microsoft, however). Microsoft has not even admitted that this bug in both Windows 95 and Windows for Workgroups affects Windows for Workgroups, apparently because they have decided not to fix it. Information on the .PWL implementation bugs was first broached on the sci.crypt newsgroup in late November 1995, then discussed on the cypherpunks list and refined for Community ConneXion's "Hack Microsoft" promotion, http://www.c2.org/hackmsoft/. We have since been given a sample trojan horse that will very efficiently exploit this bug in Windows for Workgroups. Distributed as a Word Basic virus, MIME attachment, or downloadable archive (note that Exchange and Internet Explorer unwisely execute downloaded binaries without even a virus check, a problem that Sun's Java has long acknowledged and addressed), this trojan horse could collect passwords and other sensitive information from .PWL files and other sources and send them out via email, possibly through an untraceable chain of remailers or to a throwaway trial account on, for example, America "Online." We believe that it would be highly irresponsible to release the full version of this hack, but we will soon release a crippled demonstration-only version if Microsoft does not at the very least admit that this problem has always affected Windows for Workgroups, correct their online documentation, publish the specifications of the Win95 security patch for review by outside security experts, and issue a public retraction. See also: http://www.microsoft.com/kb/peropsys/windows/90210.htm http://www.microsoft.com/windows/pr/clarifications.htm http://www.c2.org/hackmsoft/ http://www-leland.stanford.edu/~llurch/win95netbugs/faq.html {mirror of above} http://www.mari.su/guide/win95/ {mirror of above} ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/mirrors/win95net/ {more mirrors are under construction in Australia and elsewhere} In other news, I assume everyone knows by now that NT's claimed C2 security rating was granted *for use a standalone workstation only*. It has been widely reported that its NetWare Services implementation does not ask for passwords for nonexistent usernames, making a potential cracker's job that much easier. The correct response, which is given by real NetWare servers and other servers that are certified C2-secure on networks, is to silently ask for a password in all cases. I started getting copies of hackmsoft@c2.org mail on December 20th. It's really depressing. We've also seen problems with Microsoft Access 95's security. Basically, there is none. Anyone can access the network-enabled Access as any user without knowing the password. We don't think it would be responsible to publicly release this hack, either, until Microsoft has had another chance to patch the hole (they've known about it for some time). These are far, far worse than the widely publicized bugs in Netscape's SSL implementation, which have been fixed. Yet the only place I've seen them mentioned is the lapdog Seattle Times, which only reports bug *fixes* in glowing terms. Is anybody listening? - -rich owner-win95netbugs@lists.stanford.edu ftp://ftp.stanford.edu/pub/mailing-lists/win95netbugs/ gopher://quixote.stanford.edu/1m/win95netbugs http://www-leland.stanford.edu/~llurch/win95netbugs/faq.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMPHZrI3DXUbM57SdAQFojwP/T0CIjfyEz5NHD81wPdkAuUf1YCB8OE3/ 4NakffTxzmPxJXRT/MoRpOMn4qJa6mzC6WAgAdwtKWG/3K9WS1LNgM/w/PYMHj45 pEQroJBzoXU/Sctjnyz87FBl2/m6dwAdvPQqGOzGqsLVDaFsmqbWtalkvP2y0707 ntdb2fkqpNI= =q491 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----